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A Decolonial Critique of the Racialized
“Localwashing” of Extraction in Central Africa
Amber Murrey

and Nicholas A. Jackson†

School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford
†Centre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience, Coventry University
Responding to calls for increased attention to actions and reactions “from above” within the extractive
industry, we offer a decolonial critique of the ways in which corporate entities and multinational institutions
draw on racialized rhetoric of “local” suffering, “local” consultation, and “local” culpability in oil as
development. Such rhetoric functions to legitimize extractive intervention within a set of practices that we call
localwashing. Drawing from a decade of research on and along the Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline, we show how
multiscalar actors converged to assert knowledge of, responsibility for, and collaborations with “local” people
within a racialized politics of scale. These corporate representations of the racialized “local” are coded through
long-standing colonial tropes. We identify three interrelated and overlapping flexian elite rhetoric(s) and
practices of racialized localwashing: (1) anguishing, (2) arrogating, and (3) admonishing. These elite
representations of a racialized “local” reveal diversionary efforts “from above” to manage public opinion,
displace blame for project failures, and domesticate dissent in a context of persistent scrutiny and criticism from
international and regional advocates and activists. Key Words: coloniality, decolonial, elite, extraction, racism.
为了回应加强关注搾取产业 “由上而下” 的行动与反动之呼吁，我们对企业和跨国机构在石油产业中运用 “地方”
受苦、“地方” 谘询，以及 “地方” 罪责作为发展修辞的方式，提出去殖民的批判。此般修辞用来正当化在一系
列我们称为 “洗刷地方” 的实践中的搾取性介入。我们运用在乍德—喀麦隆油管及其沿线历经十年的研究，展现
多重尺度行动者如何在种族化的尺度政治中聚合，以声称对 “地方”人民的知识、责任与合作。这些企业对种族
化的 “地方” 之再现，通过长期存在的殖民修辞进行编码。我们指认跨国政商关系绵密的菁英有关种族化的洗刷
地方的三大相关且重叠的修辞与实践：（1）痛苦、（2）僭越、（3）劝告。这些对种族化的 “地方” 的菁英式
再现，揭露了在受到国际与区域倡议者及社会运动者持续检视的脉络中，通过 “由上而下” 的分化来管理群众意
见、转移计画失败的指责，以及驯化异议者的意图。关键词：殖民性，去殖民，菁英，搾取，种族主义。
Respondiendo a reclamos por la creciente atencion a las acciones y reacciones que vienen “desde arriba” al
interior de la industria extractiva, presentamos una crıtica descolonial a la manera como las entidades
corporativas y las instituciones multinacionales se apoyan en una retorica racializada del sufrimiento “local”, la
consulta “local” y la culpabilidad “local” en el contexto de petroleo como desarrollo. Tal retorica funciona para
legitimar la intervencion extractiva dentro de un conjunto de practicas que nosotros denominamos localwashing
[“lavadolocal”]. Basandonos en una decada de investigacion sobre el Oleoducto Chad–Camerun, efectuada a lo
largo del mismo, mostramos como actores multiescalares convergieron a reivindicar el conocimiento de la gente
“local” y a asumir responsabilidad y colaboracion con esta gente, dentro de polıticas racializadas de escala. Estas
representaciones corporativas de lo “local” racializado estan codificadas a traves de tropos coloniales de vieja
data. Identificamos tres retoricas de la elite flexiana y practicas de lavadolocal racializado, interrelacionadas y
superpuestas: (1) angustiantes, (2) apropiantes, y (3) amonestantes. Estas representaciones elitistas de un “local”
racializado revelan esfuerzos distractivos “de arriba” para manipular la opinion publica, desplazar la culpa de los
fracasos en los proyectos y domesticar el disentimiento en un contexto de escrutinio y crıtica persistentes de
abogados y activistas internacionales y regionales. Palabras clave: colonialidad, descolonial, elite, extraccion, racismo.
In 2013, Roger Leeds, the Director of the Centerfor International Business and Public Policy atJohns Hopkins and former international finance practitioner, argued that the Chad–Cameroon OilPipeline had been an “extraordinary opportunity forthe World Bank. This is exactly what the World
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Bank was put on the earth to do: alleviate poverty, do
capacity building, provide private sector approval.”
Leeds (2013) made the declaration at a seminar titled,
“The Role of Public Policy in Private Sector
Development,” which took place at University of
Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa. Some forty audi-
ence members, mostly African consultants, policy-
makers, and academics working on the African
continent, were gathered to deliberate on the particu-
lars of this “oil as development” project. Oil as devel-
opment is a shifting constellation of ideas grounded
on the notion that oil extraction and production can
and will initiate development and improve people’s
well-being in extractive zones. The UCT seminar
included a discussion of various aspects of the project’s
eventual failure to deliver on the promises of oil as
development—a failure that was publicly signaled by
the World Bank’s ultimate withdrawal from the pipe-
line project in 2008 (which we sketch in detail later).
An hour and fifteen minutes into the seminar,
Leeds took an informal poll of the audience. He
asked, “How many people in the room, if employed
by the Bank, would vote against the project?” Three
people raised their hands against the project. The
other thirty-seven or so people, even knowing that
the project had been a “developmental failure,”
would nonetheless vote to see the Chad–Cameroon
Pipeline to fruition. The informal poll was suggestive
of elite consensus and “expert” opinion on the eco-
nomic policy framework set forth through the pipe-
line project, even following the public multi-
institutional assessments, journalistic reports, and
academic accounts of the project’s various and con-
siderable failures. Organizations from the U.S.
Institute of Peace to the international nongovern-
mental organization (NGO) Human Rights Watch
called the reporting and monitoring structure of the
Chad–Cameroon Pipeline a “model” for “corporate
citizenship” (Shankleman 2006; Human Rights
Watch 2015). Human Rights Watch (2015) lauded
the project as “important because it shows that the
Bank is fully capable of responding more forcefully
to similar problems than it does today, if only it pos-
sessed the commitment and the political will” (90).
The latter plaudit was made even as the social wel-
fare portion of the Chad–Cameroon Pipeline
remained patently and publicly unfulfilled.
How do we explain this persistent faith in extractive
projects as modernizing, even in the face of assiduous
failures? Part of the explanation lies in the relentless
optimism of profit-driven, often nationalistic, imagina-
ries and the anticipatory politics of corporate elite
within the hydrocarbon industry (Kama 2013; Mason
2015; Weszkalnys 2015). Yet, the persistent will to
extract is reflective of and dependent on more than
those anticipatory effects generated and experienced in
what Mason (2015) referred to as the “events
collectives” of oil elites. In part, as we aim to show, it is
also because the hegemonic rhetoric of oil as develop-
ment occurs within and is an embedded component of
colonial and racist logics, designed and implemented
by flexian elite, or border-crossing, like-minded indi-
viduals (Mosse and Lewis 2005; Wedel 2009).
Optimistic and universal oil as development rhetoric
“makes sense” when framed apolitically (Escobar
1995), ahistorically, and postracially (Daley 2013b).
In this article, we examine some of the key poli-
tical contestations and elite rhetoric that legitimized
the Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline as an oil as devel-
opment project, both in the face of considerable
antiextractive critique and, later, in the face of the
project’s persistent failures. This historiography of
the pipeline reveals some of the shifting corporate
practices and rhetoric that we call racialized local-
washing. International audiences perceive corporate
localwashing as credible first and foremost because it
occurs within a global scalar politics founded on per-
vasive antiblackness and the continued colonial sub-
ordination of African bodies and geographies. We
draw from the literatures on race and coloniality,
antiracist feminist politics of scale, and critiques of
corporate entities to explicate the ways in which
localwashing was refined, at least partially, in
response to antiextractive critiques of the 1990s and
early 2000s and in the context of rising postracial
ideologies. We aim to explain the role of localwash-
ing as a rhetorical racializing technique that struc-
tures dominant social narratives of oil as
development in the central African countries of
Cameroon and Chad through three shifting flexian
elite practices and rhetoric(s): (1) anguishing and
victimizing the “local”; (2) arrogating, claiming, and
ventriloquizing the “local”; and, ultimately, (3)
admonishing and blaming the “local” for the broken
promises of oil as development. For the people living
along the pipeline in Cameroon, the local as imag-
ined through corporate descriptions remained chi-
merical. As we show, people lived largely at the
peripheries of the project and its networks of power,
at the same time that they critiqued its alienating
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power hierarchies and uneven practices. We con-
clude with reflections on the importance of a politi-
cally attuned decolonial geography of extraction that
demystifies the racializations and antiblack racisms
of corporate local-centric extraction.
Race, Coloniality, and Corporate Power
Race and Coloniality in Central Africa
Capitalism is racialized (Robinson 1983; Kelly
2000). Colonial-capitalist markets are “ordered by
and through race [and] race [is] a mode of classifying,
ordering, creating and destroying people, labour
power, land, environment and capital” (Tilly and
Shilliam 2017, 4). Race is a central organizing logic
of the “coloniality of power” (or “coloniality”),
which we understand to be the flexible and hetero-
geneous global structures of domination that per-
petually reinscribe colonial hierarchies and divisions
(Grosfoguel 2007; Ndlovu and Makoni 2014).
Maldonado-Torres (2007) wrote:
Coloniality … refers to long-standing patterns of
power that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that
define culture, labour, intersubjectivity relations, and
knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of
colonial administrations. (243)
Following formal decolonization, socioeconomic
and environmental inequalities persisted through
ecologically and social disruptive patterns of neo-
extractivism and petro-politics together with the
durability of the legal discursive framework of colo-
nial dispossessions. Accumulation and extraction
remain the dominant logics (Abourahme 2018;
Yusoff 2018), enduring within the mentalities, soci-
oeconomic, cultural, and knowledge structures and
relations of the “postcolonial” era (Grosfoguel
2007; Maldonado-Torres 2007; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2013).
Race, racialization, and racism are coconstitutive
of what cultural theorists and sociologists Bacchetta,
Maira, and Winant (2019, 3) called “global raciality”
within coloniality. Racialization refers to those mate-
rial processes and rhetorical practices characterized
by systematic refusals to recognize the equal human-
ity of nonwhite people (e.g., othering). Racialization
reproduces a colonial hierarchy of humanness that
both violently and unevenly structures and is struc-
tured by environments, political economies, and
nature–society relations. Through racializing
processes and their attendant racist rhetoric and
ideas, bodies, lands, and knowledges are racially cate-
gorized, hierarchized, and situated within “global
raciality” (Bacchetta, Maira, and Winant 2019).
Illusions of “postraciality,” by which we mean the
insistence on the irrelevance of race in supposed
meritocratic societies, function to obscure or invisi-
bilize racializing processes and rhetoric(s) as racist.
Postraciality has become “an indispensable compo-
nent of projects of ‘accumulation through dis-
possession’” because it is founded on a refusal to see
or acknowledge the role and function of race and
racialization within contemporary colonial capitalism
(Bacchetta, Maira, and Winant 2019, 4).
The colonial matrix is characterized by “the inextric-
able combination of the rhetoric of modernity (pro-
gress, development, growth) and the logic of coloniality
(poverty, misery, inequality)” (Bhambra 2014, 119). In
this ordering, patriarchal whiteness and antiblackness
are central in the material and symbolic establishments
of corporate knowledge and authority, as well as the
perpetuation of colonial difference. Indeed, “capitalism
is actually dependent on anti-Blackness to realize itself”
(Bledsoe and Wright 2019, 11).
In contemporary African societies, the racism of
coloniality is evidenced in the persistent and often
unspoken influences of antiblackness and white- and
light-skinned dominance within corporate public
fac¸ades. Corporate advertisements, rhetoric(s), prac-
tices, and policies are structured within and by the
logics of racial coloniality and antiblackness. From
celebrity campaigns in Sudan premised on racial
hierarchies that position “Americans as ‘powerful
saviours’ located at the top of the hierarchy of
humanity” (Daley 2013b, 383; see also Mamdani
2009), to the deployment of scientific racism to
legitimize black economic marginalization in South
Africa (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013), to racially segre-
gated labor regimes within multinational resource
extraction in Equatorial Guinea (Appel 2012), racial
hierarchies and racism are central to present-day cor-
porate dominations and dispossessions across con-
temporary Africa. We seek to push these
conversations farther by attending to the roles and
functions of racism, racialization, and antiblackness
on the African continent. Beyond the African dias-
pora and southern Africa, antiblackness and the
roles of racial difference remain understudied (Pierre
2013b; Powell et al. 2017; Murrey 2018). Powell et
al. (2017) explained that
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scholars of postcoloniality have been slow in applying
a racial analysis to the contemporary study of Africa,
despite [the] evidence of white privilege[,] questions of
relevance to African realities, and of the racial
underpinnings of global power hierarchies. (98)
Research in the social sciences on postcolonial cen-
tral Africa has paid scarce attention to the role of
race in general, including the role of whiteness and
antiblackness in ordering contemporary political
economies of extraction and dispossession. By
expanding the purview of work in decolonial poli-
tical geography, we hope to contribute to ongoing
efforts to “unnaturalize” these omissions of race,
racism, and racialization (Kobayashi and Peake
1994) from accounts of extractive intervention in a
region (central Africa) that has also been peripheral-
ized within the discipline of Anglophone geography.
Antiracist and Feminist Politics of Scale
Black feminist political geographer Daley (2008)
explained that the “dehumanization of the African
has and continues to take place on a global, contin-
ental, regional, national and local scale” (232). She
argued that it is only by “scaling up”—from the local
authority who sanctions violence against the
African, to the discrimination of the African by the
state, to the indifference of the international com-
munity—that we can we see the networking of
power that produces racialized dehumanizations
(Daley 2008). Feminist geographies of scale help to
explain the operations of racialization and practices
of racism in contemporary colonial extraction.
Extraction occurs within the coloniality of power
and often through the deployment of racial power in
particular (Yusoff 2018). The racialized practice of
framing extractive interventions by imagining spaces
as “empty” of people (i.e., terra nullius) and nonpro-
ductive in capitalist terms have been closely chro-
nologized and critiqued (Coronil 1997; Yusoff 2018).
McKittrick (2013) wrote of the ways in which black
geographies are rhetorically vacuous and “emptied
out of life” (7). Rex Tillerson, the former senior vice
president of ExxonMobil, for example, described the
implementation of the Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline
in Chad: “We really had a blank page to start with.
… And when you have a blank page, you have the
opportunity to do some things differently” (quoted
in Useem 2002, 102). The epistemological framing
of antiblackness as absence (“a blank page”) acts as
a necessary precondition for the perpetuation of
capitalism, as the perpetual expansion of capitalist
practices requires “empty” spaces open for
appropriation—a condition made possible through the
modern assumption of Black a-spatiality. (Bledsoe and
Wright 2019, 8; this point is echoed by Daley
2013b, 390)
Whiteness is not a “fixed, biologically determined,
phenotype, but … a structural advantage, stand-
point, and set of historical and cultural practices”
(Faria and Mollett 2016, 80). Difficult to identify
precisely because it cannot be captured as a fixed
“thing,” whiteness is “a noncategory, normal, nat-
ural, indeed [by] achieving a ‘super-naturalness’ … a
‘racial grammar’ … whiteness becomes invisible”
(Faria and Mollett 2016, 80). Anthropologist Pierre
(2013a, 2013b), drawing from the work of Mahmood
Mamdani, explained the ways in which whiteness
works alongside other forms of domination in post-
colonial Ghana, including the colonial bifurcation of
Ghanaian people as customary ethnic groups. The
material and symbolic establishment of corporate
knowledge and authority reflects the ways in which
the persistent and unspoken influences of whiteness
and racial difference remain central in present-day
geographies of extraction.
Colonial Racism and the Rhetoric and Operations
of Corporate Extraction
Coloniality, which is always already racialized,
operates through the intersecting of multiple poli-
tical and cultural practices and struggles, including
the disavowal of racism and negations of antiracism,
racial “ventriloquism,” colonial amnesia(s), willful
blindness, and white and colonial “moves to
innocence.” The disavowal of racism is apparent in
the dismissals of antiracist work on the grounds that
antiracism, in acknowledging racism, is itself a form
of racism (Elliot-Cooper 2018). White and colonial
amnesia is a set of disremembering practices that
effaces the destructive practices of European coloni-
alism and coloniality, simultaneously emphasizing
colonialist projects as “civilizing missions” that hark-
ened (or continue to harken) modernity. Racial ven-
triloquism is a related practice in which colonialists
and elites presume to speak on behalf of (and there-
fore appropriate the voice and agency) of people
racialized as black, brown, local, and “other” (Novo
2018). In postracial ideologies, as we show here,
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racial ventriloquism manifests itself as the superficial
inclusion and arrogation of nonwhite perspectives
and bodies to showcase and endorse corpor-
ate extraction.
Colonial amnesia is a form of willful blindness, by
which we mean it is an active refusal to acknowl-
edge the destructive features of colonialism.
Coloniality is obscured by strategic misinformation
that fosters a general ignorance, a practice known as
agnotology. The production of ignorance (agnotology)
is “an active construct, ‘not merely the absence of
knowledge but an outcome of cultural and political
struggle’” (Slater 2019, 23). In such struggles, colo-
nial and corporate entities frequently rhetorically
appropriate the resistance grammar and resistance
toolkits of oppressed peoples (Tuck and Yang 2012;
Kirsch 2014). Colonial misappropriations of
“decolonizing” practices, Tuck and Yang (2012)
argued, are a form of “settler moves to innocence”
(9). Colonial moves to innocence refers to the set of
tactics and techniques through which colonialists
and dominant groups capture resistance grammars
and momentum by presuming to act in the name of
that very resistance grammar.
In this article, we focus on key events, people,
and moments of racialization in the timeline of the
Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline (see Figure 1) as a
means of examining shifting corporate rhetoric.
Whereas the local is racialized and naturalized in the
service of extraction, flexian elites, such as former
World Bank president and private financier James
Wolfensohn, exercise plastic and elastic power across
the borders and scales of public and private govern-
ance. Flexians are characterized by the ability and
propensity to move within and among scales, to per-
form changing, simultaneous, contradictory roles in
the government (sometimes multiple governments),
business and corporate, nonprofit, and academic
spheres (Wedel 2009). Anthropologist Wedel
(2009) explained,
It is not just [their] time that is divided. [Their]
loyalties, too, are often flexible. Even the short-term
consultant doing one project at one time cannot afford
to owe too much allegiance to the company or
government agency. These individuals are in these
organizations (some of the time anyway), but they are
seldom of them. (1, italics in original)
The work of flexian elites is often key to the scalar
logics of colonial extraction, endowing people with
forms of privilege to move in and out of scalar
spheres while displacing blame and distancing them-
selves from fallout and criticism. Flexians are distin-
guished from other elite groups by their
unaccountability and the resultant ability to exist in
the shadows of elite authority. Unlike other elite fig-
ures, the same person can be an academic authority
(Harvard professor) and an authority of the Russian
government (signing contracts on behalf of Russia),
adopting one of whichever various changing elite
roles is most appropriate and conducive to the par-
ticular moment (Wedel 2009). Flexian role-shifting
permits the concentration of power in the hands of a
small cadre under the rubric of resource governance.
As we show, flexian elite often maintain corpo-
rate legitimacies through strategic deflections of
blame and postracial refusals. This includes the abso-
lution of racism through the insistence that racist
actions and racial inequalities are problems located
at the scale of the individual and therefore resolved
by the superficial inclusion of racialized bodies
within extractive projects. The last three decades,
we argue, have witnessed assorted efforts by flexian
elites to incorporate local peoples and knowledges
within a colonial rhetoric of corporate extraction.
We refer to these broad practices within colonial
extraction as racialized localwashing. Localwashing is
both racialized and racially coded. Discourses of
localwashing are signaled racially through synonyms
that would disavow race as a structuring logic and
feature, including native, tribal, traditional, ethnic,
indigenous, and even grassroots and African.
Localwashing rhetoric is dynamic insomuch as its
production and process shift; it is at times produced
through strategic colonial amnesias, willful blindness,
ignorance and maleducation, or the prioritization of
economic and colonial interests.
The elite rhetoric(s) of the racialized local that
we refer to in this article might be actually believed
by institutionally embedded elite actors—that is,
maybe the people we refer to here believed that they
were or are doing good. Intention and belief are not
our concern; nor do we seek to impose a determinis-
tic or simplistic interpretation of complex interac-
tions within extractive “governance”; indeed, the
rhetoric that we track herein might not have been
deliberate, planned, or coordinated. Spillers (2003)
articulated the importance of “interstitial” thinking
as a way to work against the tendency for hiatuses,
intervals, and “punctualities (in a linked sequence of
events) … [to] go unmarked so that the mythic
A Decolonial Critique of “Localwashing” 5
view remains undisturbed” (14). Corporate omission
and selected silence—that is, the production of hia-
tuses and gaps in official or public scripts—are widely
recognized patterns of elite and corporate manage-
ment strategies (Jackson 2013). Through interstitial
thinking, we know through and despite these gaps, as
a means of refusing to allow the “mythic view” of oil
as development to “remain undisturbed” (Spillers
2003). We critique these practices and rhetoric(s) as
spatially operational and materially violent, irrespect-
ive of intentionality, naivete, or claims to benevo-
lence or innocence.
Where We Speak From, Who We
Speak With
This research is based on ethnographic and
mixed-methods work with people living along the
Figure 1. Map of Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline. Source: Author.
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Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline in two rural commu-
nities in Cameroon (2012–2013 and 2018), discus-
sions with antiextraction and environmental justice
advocates, and interviews with oil consortium repre-
sentatives in Cameroon. We have conducted rhe-
torical or visual analysis of (1) hundreds of pages of
oil consortium project reports, memos, leaked
internal correspondence, and briefs (written between
1998 and 2016); (2) consortium-sponsored films; (3)
public forums and media discussions considering
aspects of the pipeline; and (4) gray materials from
transnational advocacy networks (TANs), NGOs,
and activists. As such, this article builds on more
than a decade of work on extraction in and beyond
the region of central Africa. We situate our “locus of
enunciation” (Mignolo 2005, 111) from our engage-
ments in Cameroon and elsewhere with scholars,
activists, and people struggling within and resisting
against colonial extraction.
Decolonial perspectives emphasize the urgencies
of “undoing colonialism, or perhaps never succumb-
ing to it” (Bacchetta, Maira, and Winant 2019, 3).
At the same time, postcolonial geographer Noxolo
(2017) cautioned, “Decolonial theory can become
yet another instrument for time-honoured colonialist
manoeuvres of discursively absenting, brutally
exploiting and then completely forgetting Indigenous
people” (343). Our recognition of the ongoing colo-
niality of knowledge demands that we remain vigi-
lant about the ways in which our work risks
replicating various aspects of coloniality; we make
humble and yet-unfinished efforts to attend to
decolonial options.
A Brief History of the Chad–Cameroon
Oil Pipeline
Oil reserves were discovered in Chad’s southern
Doba Basin in the early 1970s. At the time, corpo-
rate cost–benefit analysis appraised an extractive proj-
ect to be infeasible due to an ongoing civil war in
Chad, the immediate difficulties of exporting the
crude (as Chad is a landlocked country), as well as
the high sulfur content (and therefore relatively low
quality) of the crude. The Chadian Civil War ended
in 1979. In 1993, an oil consortium initially com-
posed of Exxon, Shell, and Elf came together to dis-
cuss the prospect of a multicountry, multi-billion-
dollar crude oil pipeline.
Elite within the petroleum industry faced consid-
erable public outcry during this period, including the
outrage occasioned by the Exxon Valdez oil spill in
1989. Anger was compounded by the 1995 killing of
environmental and Indigenous rights activist Ken
Saro-Wiwa and eight of his associates in Nigeria.
The government of Sani Abacha, with Royal Dutch
Shell Petroleum’s complicity of silence, had executed
the Indigenous environmental activists. Meanwhile,
the international publicity driven by Greenpeace
around Shell’s plan for sinking the Brent Spar oil
platform in the North Sea increased awareness of
the ecological dangers of oil extraction. These move-
ments were unified by a demand to wrest control of
resources from the hands of powerful global corpo-
rate entities. The World Bank was brought into the
project to assist in securing funding and to establish
a framework for oil as development in Chad that
might respond to and mitigate anticorporate and
antiextractive resistance.
Throughout the 1990s, internal World Bank and
consortium documents acknowledged the pressures
from social movements, including those organizing
against the pipeline (World Bank 2006). Embroiled
in their own scandals (Shell’s role in the Ogoni 9
killings and Elf’s 1994 fraud scandal), Shell and Elf
withdrew from the project. ExxonMobil was joined
by the U.S. corporation Chevron and the Malaysian
oil and gas company Petronas. In the late 1990s,
World Bank president (1995–2005) James
Wolfensohn unveiled an “unprecedented” develop-
ment practice to address the Bank’s previous failures
of development as structural adjustment.
(Wolfensohn argued that intergovernmental devel-
opment organizations had neglected the “social side”
of the development “balance sheet.”) By 1998, the
Chadian government had signed the World
Bank–recommended revenue management law,
which stipulated how oil revenues would be spent
within Chad. In 2000, the project documents and
loan contracts were signed and construc-
tion commenced.
Construction of the Doba oilfield, the Kribi off-
loading vessel, and the 1,070-km-long (660 miles)
pipeline were completed in 2003. The pipeline
passes beneath 238 villages and is within 2 km of
794 additional communities (Lo 2010). The pipe-
line required an initial appropriation of 100,000 ha
of land. Described by people as “bad luck” and a
“false project” (field notes 2012), the pipeline has
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directly and indirectly augmented and reinforced
patriarchy and militarism and contributed to
ongoing ecological and climate hardships in the
region (Endeley 2010; Murrey 2015b). From its
inception in 2000 until 2016 (the year of the last
available project report), 18,000 people have been
individually compensated by the consortium for the
loss of access to land (Esso Chad/Cameroon 2016).
Meanwhile, the arable land captured for oil explor-
ation and extraction continues to expand. In
March 2011, the government of Niger signed an
agreement with the Chadian National Oil
Company to pump crude oil through the
Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline, a venture that
involves extending the pipeline nearly 1,000 km to
the Agadem oil fields.
The Racialized Localwashing
of Extraction
We argue that, in response to anticorporate and
antiextractive resistance alongside the rising postra-
cial ideologies and practices of the 1990s, corporate
elites engaged in perception management frameworks
characterized by fluctuating processes of evoking,
naming, and claiming the racialized local. Corporate
and multilateral attentions to and investments in
appearing to understand, take seriously, communi-
cate with, or valorize local knowledge, local people,
local ecologies, and local epistemologies are constitu-
tive of local-centric extraction. We refer to such cor-
porate public relations (PR) framing, claiming, and
deflecting as localwashing. In this, corporate rhetoric
of the local is a form of racialized and flexible scalar
political power. By presuming that extraction takes
place outside of racist histories of place and meaning
making, localwashing functions to legitimize extract-
ive interventions by persistently drawing on racist
beliefs of white superiority and antiblackness, all the
while silencing the role of race from such imagined
geographies. Localwashing is one mechanism within
a larger set of late-modern and postracial corporate
strategies for configuring the knowledges and socio-
scalar power relations of extraction. This includes
how localwashing acts as a means through which
flexian elite influence public responses in ways
amenable to extraction, dismiss antiextractive critics
as nonlocal, and deflect blame in racialized sca-
lar politics.
A few popular media articles have deployed the
term localwashing to refer to corporate action on
the consumption side of capitalist chains. The Web
site Grist.org, for example, listed corporations cur-
rently engaging in what they referred to as the
“ingenuity/absurdity/deception” of localwashing.
Hellmann’s Mayonnaise, Barnes & Noble, and Citgo
are among those listed.1 Advertisement, branding,
and marketing campaigns draw on images of often
essentialized local people and places to demonstrate
the “changing face” of corporate action. No longer
the globalized “footloose” entities without ethical or
social responsibilities to any one people or place
(Bryant and Bailey 1998), localwashing ad cam-
paigns seduce consumers with impressions of “buying
local.” Corporate manufacturers tout their products
as “locally sourced” or consisting of “local flavors.”
Yet, localwashing has not yet been considered se-
riously in academic research. In this, we offer a pre-
liminary consideration of the usefulness of the
concept in understanding corporate actions, rhetoric,
and processes on the production side of capitalism.
Localwashing the Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline
An analysis of flexian representational strategies
within the Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline reveals a
set of racialized corporate narratives about the local.
We refer to these hegemonic claims as efforts to
localwash otherwise unaltered structures and logics of
colonial and extractive interventions. These some-
times-conflicting productions, frames, and diffusions
of the local include the following:
1. An unpopulated, absent, or empty local.
2. A victimized local in need of intervention.
3. A local suffering at the hands of an “inept” racialized
African state.
4. An amenable, passive, and static local supportive
of extraction.
5. A violent and insurgent local capable of disrupting
extraction or siphoning profits and therefore in need
of surveillance and securitization.
6. An irresponsible local guilty of misusing reimbursement
and compensation funds and therefore accountable for
their own impoverishment.
This list of corporate-extractive imagined geogra-
phies of local people and places, albeit far from
exhaustive, reveals some of the malleability, miscel-
lany, and sharp incongruity of flexian and nonflexian
elite belief and rhetoric in regard to the local people
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and geographies within extractive projects. Some of
these hegemonic, essentialized, and superficial local
framings have been addressed elsewhere, and we do
not seek to reproduce this literature here (on absent,
essentialized, static local, see Coronil 1996, 1997;
Briggs and Sharp 2004; McKittrick 2013; on resisting
local, see Bosworth 2018). Our focus is on three
broad and often interrelated and overlapping multi-
scalar practices through which flexian elite affect
racialized localwashing: (1) anguishing, (2) arrogat-
ing, and (3) admonishing the local. Through the
rhetoric and practice of anguishing, corporate elites
then render racialized bodies as spectacles of suffer-
ing to legitimize claims about acting on behalf of the
local. Through the rhetoric and practice of arrogat-
ing, elites disappear and deny the multiple agencies
of people racialized as nonwhite, calling on select
local figureheads to speak, ventriloquize, or stand in
as unidimensional supporters and endorsers of extrac-
tion. Through the rhetoric and practice of admon-
ishing, elites blame racialized bodies and institutions
for colonial difference and the failures of the prom-
ises of oil as extraction.
Anguishing
The Corporate Gaze: The Performance and
Spectacle of Suffering and Victimhood
In the late 1990s, the U.S. company Winner and
Associates produced a twenty-minute film titled The
Chad/Cameroon Development Project: Views and Voices
on behalf of the oil corporation ExxonMobil’s
upstream affiliate in Chad, Esso Chad (see Figure 2).
The film was a promotional tool self-described as a
“module,” a term that denotes its presumed instruc-
tional value. Views and Voices was not the only video
produced and diffused on behalf of the oil consor-
tium. The consortium-sponsored film Chad, Land of
Promise (2003) had been released a few years earlier
(see Figure 3). These films were part of a larger PR
campaign to quiet transnational concerns about the
environmental, social, economic, and political con-
sequences of the pipeline.
In the opening scene of Views and Voices, the
pipeline is introduced by first describing “life in
Chad” for the spectators. The narrator declares,
According to the World Bank, Chad is the fifth poorest
nation in the world. It is a country whose people suffer
from poor health care, inadequate education and a lack
of roads, electricity, safe water, and sanitation. The
impact of these conditions is difficult to comprehend
without seeing them. This module illustrates the
difficulty of daily life in Chad. (The Chad/Cameroon
Development Project: Views and Voices 1999)
Data from the World Bank were inserted into a corpor-
ate feedback loop, to situate the pipeline within a
racialized imaginary of “local” and “African” suffering
(see Figure 4). Life in Chad is described as one of
extreme hardship, void of industrial amenities
and infrastructures. Such a life, the narrator com-
miserates, is “difficult to comprehend” for the audience:
The development of Chad’s oil fields is currently the only
opportunity the country has for economic development.
… Chad desperately needs to take maximum advantage
of this opportunity. … Chad’s poverty is deeply
entrenched, its human suffering widespread.
In a documentary film produced by the French tele-
vision channel Planete, the director-general of Esso
Chad, Ronald William Royal, takes viewers on a
tour of the extraction zone (see Figure 5). Walking
through the base station, Royal explains, “Now you
need to remember that you’re in Africa, okay? There
was nothing here … there was no electricity.”
During a later visit to a schoolroom, children stand
Figure 2. A corporate feedback loop establishes a baseline rhetoric
of local suffering. Screenshots from an oil promotional video, The
Chad/Cameroon Development Project: Views and Voices (1999).
Source: The Chad/Cameroon Development Project: Views and Voices
(1999). Collage by author.
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and perform memorized responses for Royal and the
film crew, in an oft-repeated spectacle constructed
to reveal local enthusiasm and welcome for interven-
tion in Africa.
Scholars have provided nuanced critiques of the
dehumanizing effects of such representations of vic-
timhood, which infantilize people and strip them of
agency (Said 1978; Spivak 1988; Escobar 1995). The
“[c]oloniality of being … [affected a] dehumaniza-
tion and depersonalization of colonized Africans into
damnes (the condemned people and the wretched of
the earth)” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013, 9). The imag-
ined geographies of a particular “Africa” (Mudimbe
1988; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013)—the “Africa” of victi-
mized bodies in places of poverty, conflict, under-
development, “failed states” (Gruffydd Jones 2013)—
supplied the foundation on which corporate entities
established legitimacy, authority, power, and knowl-
edge “expertise” on and for “the African local”
(Daley 2013b, 390; Daley 2013a). These imagined
geographies are “at odds with the diversity of peo-
ples, cultures and environments” (Sharp 2009, 13).
Figure 3. A collage of colonial imagined geographies of “local” African landscapes. From the top right is an opening scene of the oil
consortium promotional video, Chad, Land of Promise (2003), capturing the sun setting on an oil rig. This image has been juxtaposed
with countless other iterations, each reflective of the pervasive colonial fantasy of the “promise” of “empty” frontier spaces in Africa.
Collage by author.
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Indeed, these are not places so much as projects
(Prashad 2007). Geographies of racialized difference
are constructed not by the people in or from “local”
places but prior to an engagement with them—so
that any “empirical evidence … [is] fitted into the
categories that were already constructed” (Sharp 2009,
13, italics in original).
A decolonial critique of corporate flexians and
rhetoric builds from Cesaire’s (1953) important
“declaration of war” against colonial imaginaries. In
Discourse on Colonialism, Cesaire wrote that the col-
onizer is or was compelled to create false narrations
to justify his presence and active colonization.
Cesaire (1953) called this the “collective hypocrisy
that cleverly misrepresents problems … to better
legitimize the hateful solutions provided for them”
(32). More than fifty years later, Cesaire’s analysis of
colonialism remains relevant in explaining the cor-
porate rhetoric of racialized localwashing in the
Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline. Racialized discourses
of victimhood and saviorhood provoke forms of
“dangerous optimism” in the potentials for colonial
and capitalist solutions to colonial and capitalist
problems. Local-centric extraction reflects ongoing
patterns of racial capitalism grounded on persistent
mythologies of whiteness, in particular whiteness as
benevolence and antiblackness.
It is partly this imagined geography that allows us
to understand how and why those forty policymakers
and policy students at the UCT seminar (which we
mentioned in the introduction) voted to pursue and
support a project like the Chad–Cameroon Oil
Pipeline, even in the face of its numerous failures.
Local-centric interventions are contingent on the
perpetual racist refashionings of the local as subor-
dinate and therefore continuously receptive of proj-
ects informed by nonlocal political and
socioeconomic concerns and priorities. The politics
Figure 4. Online archives of the World Bank Group’s public briefings and press announcements regarding the Chad–Cameroon Oil
Pipeline (1999–2005). These selected sites illustrate the frequency of references to and naturalizations of poverty in the early phases of
the project. Source: World Bank Group. Collage by author.
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of scale helps to explain the performative power of
localwashing by flexians within international
milieus. Localwashing is received as legitimate, even
well intentioned, within wider publics because it
occurs within the scalar politics of racialized global
capitalism that condones persistent racialized repre-
sentations of “local” and “African” people and places
(Daley 2008). The spectacle of suffering is centrally
important for the maintenance of the system of
power. This is because the sets of beliefs constitutive
of racialized colonial power are contingent on the
“constantly renewed destruction” of African bodies
as well as the rendering visible of that suffering in
ways that occlude socioeconomic causality (Segato
2016, 620). Through the perpetuation of the base-
line rhetoric of suffering, corporate elite make vari-
ous forms of intervention necessary for the
preservation of life. Daley explained that the effect
Figure 5. The former director of Esso Chad, Ronald William Royal, tours Esso facilities and neighboring towns in southern Chad.
Source: Tchad: Main basse sur l’or noir (2005). Collage by author.
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of such discourse is the dismissal of criticism. She
wrote, “Claims of unaccountability, false authority
and racism [can be] brushed aside as minor, because
of the urgency of the need to save lives” (Daley
2013b, 390). For intervention to be imminently
needed, the local must never escape the position,
role, and function of subordination within the racial-
ized politics of scale.
Localwashing from Anticorporate Critics
That the world order is structured through colo-
niality meant that even critics of the
Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline frequently drew from
and evoked a racialized rhetoric of entrenched
human suffering to contextualize their critiques of
the extractive project. Wysham (2008), a longtime
member of an international network of activists
against the project, wrote of a “harrowing” journey
from Doba to N’Djamena: a place “littered with the
detritus of the oil rush” in a “dangerous country.”
During one nighttime ride, the vehicle narrowly
escaped a possible snare set by les coupeurs de route
(road bandits) and, in a scene described in visceral
detail, crushed a dog. Other civil society and advo-
cacy groups critical of the World Bank and the oil
consortium drew on similar naturalizations of poverty
to argue against the project.
In 2016, U.S. journalist Rachel Maddow did an
extended expose of oil extraction in Chad, critiquing
the role played by U.S. President Donald Trump’s
selection for Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson.
Tillerson was the CEO of ExxonMobil at the time
that the company was developing the pipeline. In
the opening sequence, Chad is described as “one of
the poorest countries on earth, it is considered to be
one of the most corrupt countries … and the rest of
the world, sadly, has never much cared” (Maddow
2016). U.S. investigative journalist Steve Coll’s oft-
repeated description of Chad, for example, also
echoes that of the oil consortium. In a 2011 talk at
the Carnegie Council about how ExxonMobil acts as
a “global empire,” he introduced the pipeline by first
establishing “a context.” He said, “Chad, which is a
really moving and benighted place, fortunately only
11 million people live there, but it’s a pretty miser-
able place … kind of a fourth world country, really”
(Coll 2011). He repeated this description almost ver-
batim in several additional public forums (available
on YouTube, see, e.g., Coll [2012]). These flexian
narratives of anguishing obscure the heterogeneity of
human experience while preserving the colonial
logic of benevolent interveners concerned with pov-
erty eradication. Anguishing, as a method of racial-
ized localwashing, would deny the agency of people,
while claiming to act on their behalf.
Although people’s accounts of life along the pipe-
line have been dissimilar, they are alike in challeng-
ing corporate visualizations of them as eagerly
compliant to or endorsing of extraction in their
communities (Endeley 2010; Murrey 2015b, 2016).
Embodied experiences of the historical duration of
colonial violence were illustrated in people’s com-
pounding accounts of physical pain and emotional
discomfort across time (field notes 2012, 2013,
2018). People in Nanga-Eboko and Kribi, two towns
along the pipeline, spoke of being “treated worse
than animals,” being “treated like slaves,” and being
“recolonized” (field notes 2012, 2013). By drawing
on critiques of colonialism, slavery, and imperialism,
people characterized and described their experiences
with awareness of historical and structural patterning
(field notes 2012, 2013). These sentiments reflect a
consciousness critical of corporate and hegemonic
racializing rhetoric and racist practice.
Arrogating
Corporate Naming, Claiming, and Ventriloquizing
the Local
In September 2000, Wolfensohn made a bold
statement about “African” support for the
Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline. He declared,
I have one thousand Africans working at the Bank, who
unanimously support the Chad–Cameroon Pipeline.
And I vigorously support the Chad–Cameroon Pipeline.
This is not for the people in Berkeley to decide
[referring to Northern-based advocacy organizations].
This is for people in Chad to decide. And I think it’s
important that we have a proper balance between the
Berkeley mafia and the Chadians and I, for my part, am
more interested in the Chadians.
Wolfensohn’s statement about “vigorous” support for
“people in Chad” and his condescension for “the
Berkeley mafia” in the context of the
Chad–Cameroon Pipeline demonstrate another
aspect of the rhetorical function of the local in legit-
imizing corporate extraction. Wolfensohn showed
little hesitancy in claiming the voice of “all
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Africans” working at the Bank and then mobilized
an essentialized “African” identity to speak on behalf
of “the Chadians” and against irrational and mafia-
like “nonlocals.” His words conjured a pan-African
network of support for the project. He later declared,
“Every president of every African country supported
the Chad–Cameroon Pipeline” (Mutume 2000,
italics added). These declarations were neither
exceptional nor transient.
Rather, Wolfensohn’s words evoke the strategic
“face value” of the incorporation of “Africans”
within extraction. Critical legal scholar Leong
(2013) argued that a defining feature of racial capi-
talism is “the process of deriving social and economic
value from racial identity” (2152). This is reflected in
those particular patterns within “predominantly white
institutions [that] use nonwhite people to acquire
social and economic value” (Leong 2013, 2152).
Indeed, a central marker of postraciality has been the
strategic rendering visible of bodies of color, predomi-
nantly black and African bodies, in support for racist,
colonial, and capitalist projects and endeavors. Kendi
(2016) explained, “Black people … always proved to
be the perfect dispensers of racist ideas” (290).
Racialized localwashing frequently entails an instru-
mentalization of African and black bodies, collabora-
tors, and knowledges for racist and extractive
projects. Such incorporations were meant to signify
racial harmony as well as the fulfillment of corporate
social responsibility (CSR). At the same time, those
“1,000 Africans at the Bank” did not enjoy equal
opportunities for recruitment, promotion, or retention
within the institution. Racial discrimination within
the World Bank has been documented by ethnogra-
phers and journalists and substantiated by internal
task force reports (Edwards 2009).
In another effort to localwash the project, a Paris-
based Senegalese dance troupe was flown to the 1999
World Bank and International Monetary Fund
annual meetings in Washington, DC, to “support”
the pipeline. At the meetings, corporate elite held
them up as “Africans” who had come to “show soli-
darity with the project” (Horta 2002, 176). A group
of Chadians and Cameroonians were flown in to
lobby for the project under the auspices of represent-
ing “local” civil society. Horta (2002), a senior envir-
onmental economist at Environmental Defense and a
longtime critic of the pipeline, noted that none of
these people had known affiliations with civil society
groups on the ground. “Embarrassingly,” she
explained, “their written statement was identical to
an official statement in support of the project pub-
lished by the Chadian embassy” (Horta 2002, 176).
Such episodes reveal the one-dimensional evoca-
tions of “the local,” in which any African person
functions to localwash corporate action. In the con-
text of natural resource extraction in Ecuador, Novo
(2018) similarly identified ventriloquism as a tool of
racist domination in which non-Indigenous people
speak on behalf of Indigenous people. In postracial
rhetoric, geographic, linguistic, and cultural distinc-
tions are flattened to allow a rapid and superficial
incorporation that suits corporate interests and
reflects the colonial logics of white institutions.
Localwashing strips the local of internal diversities
by simplifying social and political relations within
local places and discursively erasing—that is, clean-
ing or whitewashing—the project’s profit incentives
and local destructions in favor of a rhetoric of local
support. Whitewashing denotes the simultaneous
“persistent silence … about race [alongside the
ongoing] racialization in the present era, [which is]
one of ostensible racial blindness and progress”
(Inwood and Martin 2008, 392; see also Pulido
2015). Localwashing, as an extension of the logic of
whitewashing, is a postracial hegemonic tactic of
framing and interpreting practices of racial domi-
nance in ways that would silence the role of race in
structuring that very domination. Indeed, “[r]acializa-
tion sometimes appears as flat-out ignorance; it
might look ridiculous if it did not do so much dam-
age” (Bacchetta, Maira, and Winant 2019, 12).
Wolfensohn’s evocation of “African support”
occurs within a global racial hierarchy characterized
by antiblackness and white dominance. These claims
are demonstrative of a modern global political econ-
omy in which racialization is and has been
embedded in economic relations (Tilly and Shilliam
2017). Corporate entities use multiscalar tools to
visually and hierarchically separate consuming cen-
ters from producing margins (Mantz 2008); the result
is a more effective exploitation of resources
(Mitchell 1991; Apter 2008). Localwashing obscures
the operations of structural racism, while drawing on
the unstated authority of whiteness to determine
what is good, rational, profitable, and possible.
Passive and Static Local Support for Extraction
Another form of localwashing was the rhetoric of
unprecedented local collaboration propagated
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through the consortium’s public documents and
reports. In the thousands of pages of project guide-
lines, spending regulations, and environmental poli-
cies, the consortium communicated a rhetoric of
accommodation for “local” concerns and participa-
tion (see Cooke and Kothari [2001] on the seductive
rhetoric of "participation"). According to
ExxonMobil, the consortium conducted more than
1,000 village meetings or “consultations” in the year
2000 alone (ExxonMobil 2008). We calculated the
cumulative numbers cited within the consortium’s
thirty-six reports: Approximately 550,000 people
have been “consulted” during the pipeline’s eighteen
years of gestation and utility (the last annual report
calculated was from 2016). The manners and practi-
ces through which these “public information
campaigns” occurred remain unclear, although there
is occasionally reference to some of the subjects dis-
cussed. For example, publications from Esso
Cameroon (ExxonMobil’s upstream affiliate in
Cameroon) describe “routine consultations” in two
Cameroonian towns: “participants discussed what to
do if they notice something out of place along the
[pipeline] right of way. The meetings are also an
opportunity for locals to receive information about
project activities and to raise any questions, concerns
or requests they may have” (Esso Cameroon 2013,
26). There is no explanation within the documents
of what these “questions, concerns, or requests” might
be. The Community Engagement blurb of Esso’s pub-
licity campaign contains similarly vague language.
The Community Consultation section of annual
reports generally includes an image (or several) of
seated groups of Chadians or Cameroonians looking
passively at consortium representatives (see Figure 6).
The president of the Chadian Association for the
Promotion of the Defense of Human Rights,
Delphine Djiraibe, argued that the consortium’s con-
sultations did not signal consequential exchanges
between engineers, representatives, and local people.
She wrote, “The presence of the military during the
consultative sessions was enough to dissuade people
from expressing their opinions” (Djiraibe 2000). A
former World Bank spokesperson, Robert Calderisi,
described the presence of armed guards in a narrative
that echoes earlier colonial imaginaries of noble col-
onialists braving dark and dangerous Africa for the
good of “natives.” He wrote:
Exxon employees visited settlements along the pipeline
route, accompanied by soldiers or armed security
personnel. Critics argued that the presence of the
guards had prevented the Chadians from expressing
their views freely. [However,] Exxon staff, mostly
security-conscious Americans who were new to Africa,
were risking life and limb to find out what farmers and
their families thought. (Calderisi 2006, 185)
Although these ideas have shifted over time, the
genesis of corporate ideas of the subservient and
receptive local lie in precolonial corporate imagi-
naries in which European corporations were initia-
tors of what was euphemistically termed the
“civilizing mission” (see Figure 7).
During discussions with people along the pipeline
in Cameroon, people overwhelmingly reported feel-
ing either left out of consortium decision making
and information loops or being deliberately misled
during such “consultations” (Swing, Davidov, and
Schwartz 2010; Murrey 2015a, 2015b). People in
one community indicated that they were excluded
from participating in pipeline-related discussions and
that when complaints were filed they were often
intentionally squashed by consortium representatives
(field notes 2012; see also Leonard 2016).
These information sessions were designed in part
to ensure the security and material integrity of the
pipeline rather than to establish meaningful dialogue
between local stakeholders and consortium represen-
tatives. Public information campaigns were a stra-
tegic component of maintaining the material
integrity of the right-of-way by requesting nearby
communities to function as “eyes and ears” along the
pipeline (field notes 2012). People were instructed
to be alert to and report any unusual vibrations,
leaking crude, or suspicious behavior along the pipe-
line (field notes 2012, 2013). Corporate interests
were prioritized during these sessions, even as reports
would later hold them up as examples of their
“responsible” behavior. Horta noted:
There were never “real” consultations … it was
always kind of promoting the project and getting
people’s hopes up. … I remember that one of the big
consultations was only announced in the newspapers
on the day of the consultation itself. So people
couldn’t actually participate. (Interview with author,
22 February 2012)
These corporate–community sessions could result in
codifying and policing the field of possible commu-
nity responses to extraction rather than fostering
meaningful interchange (Lo 2010; Leonard 2016;
Murrey 2016). Corporate consultations can be
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occasions for corporate entities to restrict autonomy
of grassroots action by (1) “domesticating opposition
or co-opting or transforming it to align more with
state or corporate agendas” (Sawyer and Gomez
2012, 5); (2) impeding people’s “psychological free-
dom” by directing decision making into certain cor-
porate-friendly conduits (Maher 2018); (3)
producing neoliberal subjectivities that limit the
venues and vocabularies in which complaints are
either taken seriously or go unrecognized (Leonard
2016); and (4) exacerbating internal community
divisions or creating new tensions (Obi 1997;
Murrey 2015a, 2016).
Admonishing
Dismissing Critics as Nonlocal
A sizable coalition of people, advocates, and acti-
vists working against the pipeline emerged early on
in the pipeline’s planning and negotiation phases.
This diverse network of several dozen national and
Figure 6. Images of a passive and supportive local appear throughout the pages of Esso’s Year-End Reports for the Chad/Cameroon
Development Project. Source: Esso Chad/Cameroon (2016). Collage by author.
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international NGOs organized for “certain minimum
conditions” to be met before the pipeline’s construc-
tion (Djiraibe 2000, 2; see also Horta 2002; Swing,
Davidov, and Schwartz 2010). Among other objec-
tions, they expressed doubts that the international
framework for development was practical in the socio-
political contexts of both countries.
In response, the consortium deployed a campaign
of NGO disparagement, casting international NGOs
as self-promoting and distant interlocutors, and the
World Bank engaged in a tacit pacification of NGO
concerns. Leaked correspondence between Jean-
Louis Sarbib, the World Bank vice president for
Africa, and Ian Johnson, head of environment of the
Figure 7. Juxtaposing oil consortium images with images from colonial archives reveals similarities in visual aesthetics and the colonial
fantasy of a passive local. Top: A ceremony marking the formal “incorporation” of the Ewi of Ados Kingdom into the British Lagos
Protectorate, 1897. Source: The Queens Empire: A pictorial and descriptive record. London: Cassell and Company, 1897–99 (FCO Historical
Collection DA11 QUE). Bottom right: Photograph of children spinning cotton in Kamerun (Cameroon) in 1919. The original caption
reads, “Native Children Spinning Cotton in Kamerun, Africa. Kamerun was the last German province in Africa to hold out against the
Allies. This picture was taken by the Allies since they captured the colony. The natives were never before photographed.” Source: Kelly
Miller’s History of the World War for Human Rights, originally published in 1919 by A. Jenkins and O. Keller. Bottom left: Young boys
surround seated German colonists in Bamoun, Kamerun/Cameroon, 1905. Collage by author.
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Bank Information Center, revealed their objective:
“secure support for the project” by “buying time from
critics [and convincing NGOs that they] are really
prepared to listen, learn and eventually make some
proposal that might mollify them” (World Bank
memoranda, August 1999, as cited in Breitkopf
2002, 22). Horta (2012) explained that “behind the
scenes, the World Bank’s main concern was to
silence the NGO call for a moratorium” (213). The
silencing of criticism was conducted in part by a
stalling tactic Sarbib and Johnson called “listening
missions” (memo from Sarbib-Johnson 1999). That
the quotations around “listening missions” are ori-
ginal to this leaked exchange reflects an inflection
of sarcasm into the process. These so-called missions
were intended to create the appearance of listening
and hence maintain the illusion of the Bank as
receptive to negotiation—while the project’s plan-
ning and engineering moved forward.
In 2000, Wolfensohn dismissed the networks that
advocated for local rights against Bank-funded proj-
ects as too international and too distant from the
realities of local people in Chad and Cameroon.
These groups were imposing an “external” decision
making on “people in Chad.” A host of “eminent”
former World Bank employees, journalists, and aca-
demics were similarly vocal in their criticisms of
NGO involvement in the negotiation and design
phases. Activists and TAN representatives were aware
of these tactics, as Djiraibe outlined in her final pro-
ject report:
Project proponents mounted a campaign to discredit
NGOs by saying that northern NGOs were misleading
southern NGOs. The claim was that northern NGOs
were unaware of the poverty conditions in Chad and
Cameroon. The objective of this campaign was to
“delegitimize” NGOs’ work by saying that they had no
mandate to speak on behalf of people on the ground.
(Djiraibe 2000, 6; see also Horta 2002, 176)
Calderisi (2006) argued that the Environmental
Defense Fund’s opposition to the pipeline was little
more than “a litmus test of their strength as a public
interest group or a trophy for display on their entrance
hall for future donors” (184–87).2 The dismissal of
TANs and transnational NGOs as foreign-driven was
also reflected through the responses of several World
Bank officials to Harvard Law School’s 1997 critique
of the project’s revenue management system. During
testimony before the U.S. Congress Subcommittee on
Africa, a consultant to Human Rights Watch/Africa
Watch, Peter Rosenblum, recounted an instance of
flexian elite exerting personal pressure:
A number of Bank officials, who are also alumni of
Harvard Law School, called the office of the Dean of
the Law School to complain. … One of them, a
senior official in the legal department of the Bank,
told us, essentially that Africa “did not need a group of
Westerners parachuting in to tell them what to do.”
(U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
International Relations, 18 April 2002, Serial No.
107-75)
The former director-general of the Independent
Evaluation Group at the World Bank, Robert
Picciotto (1995), argued that some NGOs represented
“narrow and privileged constituencies” and therefore
needed either to police themselves or “be restrained
to work for the common good both by the workings
of the market and by the enabling environment of
the state” (10). Within the academy, Pallas (2013)
argued that TANs, by targeting projects of
“recognized democratic” governments rather than
international projects (e.g., structural adjustment writ
large), tended to undermine democracy at the expense
of the World Bank’s valuable development work.
The Financial Times and Washington Post journalist
and Council on Foreign Relations fellow Sebastian
Mallaby (2004b, 353), on the other hand, criticized
Wolfensohn’s reluctance to disengage with NGOs
and noted the usefulness of “muddied” NGO
accounts for the consortium. By muddied Mallaby
meant those activist groups that combined issues of
social well-being with environmental justice. He
argued that the Bank and the consortium “rebutted
the social and environmental charges easily: they
had the facts, they had [the anthropologist] Ellen
Brown and all her data, and many of the NGO
screamers had never been to Chad” (Mallaby 2004b,
353). By labeling civil society actors as “the
Berkeley mafia” and as “screamers” with “muddied
narratives,” Mallaby and others delegitimized the
critics of the pipeline as irrational, distant, and
inauthentic on the basis of their nonlocalness—
while reinvoking the chronicling of local poverty.
These arguments also bolstered the expertise of the
consortium, and more particularly the Bank, as well
placed to manage the complicated landscape of oil
extraction so that project proceeds were scaled in a
way that was inclusive of the local. As a PR tactic,
localwashing delegitimizes critics on the basis of
their own supposed nonlocality.
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In this way, localwashing signals a common fea-
ture of corporate response to critique: the admonish-
ing of critics through an appropriation of their own
critical vocabularies (Kirsch 2014). The focus on the
“local” and “grassroots” was a cornerstone of anticor-
porate, antiglobalization, and environmental move-
ments of the 1990s and early 2000s. The local was
repackaged to both efface the violence of extraction
and endorse corporate action as legitimately con-
cerned about local people and environments.
Scalar Displacements of Blame: The “Failed”
African State
On 9 September 2008, four days after the govern-
ment of Chad had repaid the loans incurred through
the pipeline to the World Bank, the Bank announced
that it was unable to continue its support for the
Chad–Cameroon Pipeline.3 The Bank’s press release
indicated that the social welfare portion of the pro-
ject had foundered because the Chadian government
had “failed to comply,” noting an aspiration for future
“cooperation … for rebuilding a development pro-
gram that supports the poorest people in the country”
(World Bank 2008). The Bank provided an ahistor-
ical and apolitical description of their exit—one that
erased the socio-politics of the extractive context and
effected a “move to innocence” (Tchad: Main basse
sur l’or noir (2005); for a description of the Bank’s
revenue management re-negotiation meetings with
Chad, see U.S. Embassy N’Djamena 2006).
The corporate reorganization of perception manage-
ment (triggered by pressures from antiglobalization and
antiextraction protests) was exemplified by the rise of
CSR. CSR within World Bank practices included (1) a
switch from development as structural adjustment
(based on orthodox notions of comparative advantage)
to development as governance (based on neo-institu-
tional economic notions of institutionally ingrained
economic inefficiency); (2) the institution of the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; and (3)
promises made by key corporate actors (from
Wolfensohn, to Friends of the Earth President, Ricardo
Navarro) that the Bank would institute an extractive
industries review (EIR) process to critically examine
their support of extractive industry projects (Jackson
2013). Each of these initiatives nominally arose in sep-
arate spheres, but they reflect a unified set of corporate
strategies to represent business and intergovernmental
organizations as being sensitive to the needs of the local.
In particular, each of these policy changes pivoted on a
colonial narrative of local people as being “betrayed” by
their “corrupt” and “ineffective” governments.
A cornerstone of corporate self-management is a
refusal to admit to fault or wrongdoing. Publicly, cor-
porate flexians propagated the self-image of the con-
sortium as well-intentioned intermediaries and, above
all, ultimately not responsible for failure. During a
visit to Bero town in the extractive zone in southern
Chad, the director of Esso Chad listened briefly to
one man’s complaints about the oil pipeline before
interjecting, “My advice to you is to stop turning to
Esso and to go see your government and tell them
that now the government has the resources for the
local population.” The racialized localwashing of the
pipeline also extended to the blaming of the local for
project failures. In response to indications of height-
ened levels of poverty in the region, local officials
and informal rhetoric emerged accusing the local of
misspending, irresponsibility, and alcoholism (field
notes 2012). This rhetoric echoes colonial tropes of
the native as agents of their own misfortune.
Scale is central in such corporate negotiations and
blame displacements. Corporate elite rework “socio-
spatial processes [that] change the importance and
role of certain geographical scales … alter[ing] the
geometry of social power by strengthening the power
and the control of some [scales] while disempowering
others” (Swyngedouw 2010, 7). Blame and responsi-
bility for failures are deflected onto other scales of
social activity (Escobar 2001; Daley 2008).
Hegemonic scalar jumping includes the manner in
which corporate flexians and institutions absolve
themselves of culpability or forge alliances within glo-
balized scalar processes. Racialized localwashing was
crucial to corporate tactics of scalar blame diffusion
in the Chad–Cameroon Oil Pipeline.
Such corporate rhetoric reflects a multiscalar ra-
cialization of African institutions and peoples across
scales within extractive capitalism (Daley 2008) and
denotes the continued prominence of whiteness and
white hegemony in framing and normalizing corporate
regulation, tactics, and alliances. As we have shown,
TANs are dismissed as nonlocal. Meanwhile, African
states are racialized as incompetent, greedy, or villain-
ous; as the exploiters and mis-managers of the local and
hence the root cause of local suffering. The reification
of an African state as incapable of serving the needs of
its citizens further legitimizes the ideologies of colonial
interventions—setting the tone for future extractions.
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Conclusion
This article has brought together literature on
decolonial thought and racial coloniality, feminist
politics of scale, and geographies of extraction to
challenge colonial rhetoric and localwashing within
extraction. Flexian elite make localwashing work by
appropriating the agencies and heterogeneities of
people, racializing the local as inferior, passive, and
receptive of extractive interventions. Localwashing
operates within a constellation of configurations of
whitewashing, including those long-standing imperial
and colonial practices of blanching violence through
self-celebrations and strategic suppressions, falsifica-
tion, and appropriations of other knowledges.
Operating like corporate “greenwashing,” which
would legitimize corporate projects through a veneer
of ecological (i.e., “green”) responsibility, elites use
localwashing to appropriate the language of local
rights, knowledge, and bodies for corporate projects.
In doing so, they legitimize corporate extractions as
socially and locally responsible, invisibilizing the vio-
lence(s) of extraction. More work is needed on the
role and function of localwashing in other industries
and economic spheres within racialized systems of
power, including more recent articulations thereof.
In addition, more work is needed on the roles
that academics play at all scales as experts in the
structuring and querying of the local within the con-
tested spaces of extraction. This includes serious
considerations of the roles of scholars in authoring
governance plans and reports as well as their roles as
critical interlocutors for the control of physical space
in service of extractive projects (see Grovogui and
Leonard 2007). For example, at various stages of the
pipeline’s development, representatives of
ExxonMobil and the World Bank drew on and cited
anthropological scholarship to support the consor-
tium’s understanding and integration of the local
into the structures of the project. How does social
science scholarship render the local clean, passive,
coherent, or receptive for extraction’s legitimizing
narratives? Fundamentally, how do academics
account for their roles in promoting localwashing,
and how are they and other elite held accountable
for their roles? Are they acting to contribute to the
production of knowledge or are they, like other elite,
complicit in mobilizing racialized logics of localwash-
ing? This article does not directly address these ques-
tions, but we do foreground the importance of more
work in these areas.
At the same time, academics have documented
the material and psychological damages incurred at
the scale of the “local” through extractive projects. In
this context, the late anthropologist Coronil (1996)
stressed the need to analyze “not a reality outside rep-
resentation that analysis can apprehend directly, but
… the effects of existing representations [so that we
may] contribute to developing more enabling ones”
(75). From this engagement, we argue for the contin-
ued need for academia as both an object of study and
more effective interlocutor in the geographies of colo-
niality and extraction. Moving forward, we “should
intensify our efforts to be ‘unscrupulously vigilant …
about our complicity’ … [and must continue to]
‘think otherwise’” (Baaz and Verweijen 2018, 66).
We find Daley’s comments on the political poten-
tials of agency to be fruitful here. She wrote:
Enabling political “agency” is not “a romantic
argument,” but a recognition that sustainable solutions
lie not with … interventions, but in the capacity for
people to champion their rights within the local and
national space, and a recognition of the lived realities
of [people] which … may suggest new ways of
reimaging the political community. (Daley 2013a, 909)
In the context of racializing and racist extractive
intervention, we draw on a politically attuned geog-
raphy sufficient to the tasks of (1) critiquing the
multiscalar racializations of corporate hegemony in
local-centric extractive intervention; (2) imagining
and assisting in the creation of other worlds; and (3)
holding ourselves and others accountable for our rep-
resented and lived locations within and movements
through contested spaces of the academy and colo-
nial extraction. An antiracist double critique is
necessary, one that relates contemporary and histor-
ical patterns of intervention and extraction with the
critique of the racializations of these processes.
Corporate imagined geographies of the local reflect
corporate beliefs, rhetoric(s), and PR mechanisms
and not a “real” geography or people. Nine years after
the oil began pumping through the pipeline, Elie
reflected on the destruction of his farm during the
pipeline’s construction. He scoffed dramatically when
asked about his experiences living near it. Reflecting
on his community’s sweeping dissatisfaction with the
consortium’s rhetoric of development, Elie said, “Can
the pipeline not explode? Can it not be broken?!”
(field notes 2012). The demystification of the racist
corporate rhetoric of localwashing is a provisional
move toward the disruption of extraction.
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Notes
1. The list of localwashing in marketing and sales is
available from Hiskes (2009).
2. Mallaby (2004a) downplayed his rhetoric with more
balanced statements about NGOs during a Robert F.
Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights public
debate in 2004.
3. These were loans incurred through the International
Financial Corporation, the private-sector arm of the
World Bank, which raised US$200 million in
financing for the project.
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